

Staff George Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark, Admiral Anderson, who became battleship commander at Pearl Harbor, the intelligence officers Edwin Layton and Irving Mayfield, and the cryptographer Joseph John Rochefort. The vastness of such a conspiracy falls of its own weight.

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*Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations.* By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000. xxiv, 264 pp. \$34.95, ISBN 0-89096-969-8.)

Partly by design, partly by accident, partly by invitation, and partly owing to the strength of its institutions, the United States has become an empire. It did not initiate war with Japan, but it successfully countered Japan's expansionism, not to say its atrocities, in a military conflict that lasted nearly four years, took roughly 139,000 American lives, and wounded over 300,000 more. Total United States casualties in the battle for Okinawa alone were 49,151—including 12,520 killed in action. Little wonder, one should note, that the United States might expect to influence or control Japanese territories at war's end, especially those considered strategically valuable.

Why the United States decided to occupy Okinawa, why it chose to make the island a virtual colony, and why, ultimately, it chose to return it are the themes of this excellent study. The United States originally held Okinawa because it feared future Japanese aggression. Given Japan's history of militarism, Japanese revanchism constituted no small concern. Even after the signing of the Japanese peace treaty, American officials worried about Japan's dependability as an ally. Then the United States became concerned about Soviet expansion and Chinese Communist aggression. The island's strategic location allowed United States Air Force planes using its bases to strike at targets in Asia and parts of Europe. Additionally, powerful sentiment held that "we won that damned war"; since we took Okinawa

in a bloody battle against an unscrupulous enemy, we should keep it. But the keeping meant vicious bureaucratic infighting within American policy circles, some of the most bitter of which occurred between the American high commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Lt. Gen. Paul Caraway, and the ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer. Reischauer, the author correctly points out, was never as closely associated with President John F. Kennedy as scholars have been wont to believe. Eventually Japanese and Okinawan protest against the American presence led to demands for the island's return to Japan, especially as Japan found itself more closely associated with United States interests during the Cold War era.

Although the United States became Okinawa's colonial master, American colonialism differed in quality and style from that of other nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century imperial powers. Misbehavior by military occupiers occurred all too frequently and unfortunately did not end with reversion. But the island never profited the United States in any economic sense; its commercial or investment value proved negligible. Indeed, the United States contributed heavily to the island's economic reconstruction and its political stability. The American presence benefited the Japanese and the Okinawans to a significant degree. Ultimately, however, favorable Japanese-American relations depended on reversion, a step successfully concluded during the Nixon administration.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes tells this story, based on extensive archival research, in clear, well-rendered prose. His book is a valuable addition to the body of scholarship on Japanese-American relations and to the work on policy formulation within the United States.

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*The War against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy.* By Brian Waddell. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. x, 226 pp. \$39.00, ISBN 0-87580-272-9.)